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I.  INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Stephen Derrig, an Akron firefighter, went to a number of doctors seeking a 
diagnosis for his breathlessness and fatigue.1  Laying in a hospital bed he was told that he had 
tested positive for HIV, which had progressed to AIDS.2  Derrig is a heterosexual man who is 
married.3  Luckily, neither his wife nor his children has been diagnosed with the virus.4  He is 
not an IV drug user.5  He contracted the disease while at his job, as a fire fighter.6  It is not 
known by whom he was infected.7  As a firefighter he has assisted countless people.8  He does 
not know in which encounter he contracted the infection.9  He assumes he became infected on 
the job because he does not engage in any of the behaviors that are typically associated with HIV 
transmission.10
He went public with his case in order to shatter the misperceptions surrounding AIDS.11  He 
believes that an infected public safety employee should continue to work in his or her position.12
One of the differences from when Derrig was infected to the current situation is awareness.  The 
medical profession and governmental agencies have publicly stated the employees in fields 
where transmission is a possibility should be able to continue in their positions as long as 
universal precautions are utilized.
Physicians have offered their support to Derrig.13  Derrig is back to work staffing the fire 
truck.14  He is not serving in his former position as a firefighter.  Contrary to popular belief the 
position transfer is not due to the fire department being fearful of transmission, but that Derrig 
would be compromising the fragility of his immune system.15  Dr. Trish Perl, M.D., at John 
Hopkins Hospital and Health System in Baltimore, oversees a committee that devises work plans 
for employees who have contagious diseases.16  She claims, “ [All] too often people want to 
2spirit away the worker out of fear he or she will spread the disease.”17  She argues that with 
simple precautions it is not necessary for an employee to quit.18  The precautions will provide 
enough protection to contain the disease.  She points out that neither Derrig’s wife nor children 
have the disease, which verifies that the disease is not easily transmittable.19
Society, including the legal profession, is fearful of the risk of transmission of HIV in an 
occupational setting.  This is particularly true for those in the health care and public safety 
settings (fire fighters, police, and healthcare practitioners).  This note will assert that the law 
should afford HIV infected public safety and healthcare employees the right to continue in their 
occupations.  According to current medical evidence, when public safety and healthcare 
employees use universal precautions the risk of transmission to a person(s) assisted is 
insignificant.  
In the beginning of the epidemic, the medical profession had yet to conduct research, and the 
risks of HIV/AIDS were largely unknown.  Under those circumstances, it is understandable that 
the courts may have been overly cautious when confronted with cases involving HIV/AIDS.  
However, twenty years after the epidemic surfaced, the medical evidence should calm irrational 
fears that have plagued society.  The misguided fear arises because the job duties of public safety 
and healthcare personnel may include direct contact with bodily fluids.  
Currently, the great majority of courts have ruled that HIV infected employees should not 
continue in these occupations.  Viewed in the light of available medical evidence and statistical 
data these rulings represent an overreaction caused by fear surrounding the epidemic.  These 
courts have not measured actual risk against the statutory standards required by Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 and Americans with Disability Act (ADA).  In these cases the courts have held that 
when there is any conceivable risk, no matter how theoretical, the employee must discontinue his 
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statutory guidelines, permitting employees to continue in their occupations because the risk that 
HIV public safety and healthcare employees pose to the public is infinitesimal.  
This note will critically analyze decisions that do not support public safety and health care 
employees continuing in their professions.  The note opens first with an examination of the 
history of AIDS and recent treatment of the disease.  The second and third sections discuss the 
statutes and two leading case decisions that involve the treatment of AIDS.  The fourth section 
will analyze the cases that do not support employment of HIV persons in the public safety and 
healthcare fields.  The fifth section discusses cases that favorably treat HIV persons allowing 
them to continue in their positions in the public safety and healthcare fields.  Finally, in the sixth 
section the note will conclude with what one may draw from the present medical evidence and 
statistics and how the present treatment of HIV is similar to the past treatment of persons thought 
to present a threat of communism.  
II. HISTORY AND COMMUNICABILITY OF THE DISEASE
A. History
AIDS first emerged in the mid-1970s in Central Africa.20  The first known person to be 
infected with AIDS was a surgeon working in Zaire.21  In the 1980’s similar symptoms appeared 
in New York City’s gay community.22  It was a disease that seemed to primarily affect one’s 
immune system.23  The Center of Disease Control (CDC), the leading federal agency for 
protecting the health and safety of people, was unsure on how to handle, prevent, and minimize 
the impact of the disease.24
In 1981, a French flight attendant, known as Gaetan Dugas was treated in New York City for 
a skin condition identified as Kaposi’s Sarcoma.25  The condition is an ailment of AIDS.  
4Through Dugas’ sexual partners, medical researchers gained knowledge that the disease was 
transmitted through sexual contact. 26 By the mid-1980’s, the disease was prevalent in gay 
communities across America.27
 Two decades ago it was known primarily as a disease that infected gay men.28  A recent 
CDC survey showed that more than thirty percent of gay black males ages twenty-three to 
twenty–nine in six United States cities have HIV.29  However, today it is a disease that infects 
people of every age, nationality, and sexuality.30  Presently, there are approximately 800,000 to 
900,000 people living in the United States who are infected with HIV.31  Each year an additional 
40,000 people will become infected.32  Universally, there are approximately forty million people 
living with HIV around the world.33
The disease is communicated through sexual contact, the exchange of bodily fluids, and from 
mother to child through pregnancy.34  Having unprotected sex, sharing used needles, and a 
mother passing the disease to her child through vaginal fluids or breast-feeding are the most 
common forms of transmission.35  A person who is infected with the HIV virus may remain 
healthy and show no physical effects for four to seven years.36
Once a person is infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) it is inevitable that the 
infection will progress to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).37  The virus invades 
primarily white cells and body tissues.38  The virus attaches to the cell and fuses into the cell’s 
membrane.39  The effect is that the body is unable to fight off infection and the body’s immune 
system is compromised.40
Society has reacted to AIDS hysterically, with minimal empathy, logic, or compassion.  A 
case in 1991 illustrates this point.41  After John Doe was arrested, he disclosed to police officers 
that he was HIV positive.42  Later that day, Doe’s car rolled down a hill and struck a neighbor’s 
5fence.43  The police told the neighbor that Doe was infected with AIDS.44  The neighbor was 
very distraught because Doe’s and the neighbor’s children went to school together.45  The 
neighbor contacted other parents and the media.46  Consequently, the next day nineteen children 
were removed from the school Doe’s children attended.47  These events occurred because of the 
irrational fear surrounding the disease.  
The disease affects every aspect of a person’s life.  The stigma attached to HIV/AIDS has 
horrendous consequences.  Society’s treatment of the disease causes a person infected with AIDS 
to have not only emotional but financial consequences as well, such as the loss of the person’s 
job and health insurance.  These are consequences that may lead to poverty.  Despite contrary 
evidence, society is not convinced that HIV cannot be spread through casual contact.48
Early on, the government did not address society’s fear of the disease.49  In the crucial years 
of the 1980’s, the administration led by Ronald Reagan did little to calm the apprehension and 
falsities surrounding the disease.50  Twenty years after AIDS appeared in the United States, the 
legal profession is still struggling to come to terms with disease, just as much as the rest of the 
population.
B. Precautions
To prevent the transmission of HIV in occupational settings, leading government agencies 
such as the CDC, as well as others recommend the use of universal precautions. 
One such government agency is the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration.  
They suggest wearing gloves, protective glasses, and masks.51  They did not make any of the 
provisions mandatory until 1992.52  Another, the CDC, identifies some of the same precautions 
such as the use of gloves, gowns, aprons, masks, or protective eyewear, which can reduce the 
risk of exposure of the health care worker's skin or mucous membranes to potentially infective 
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workers take precautions to prevent injuries caused by needles, scalpels, and other sharp 
instruments or devices. 53
The following is a partial list of universal precautions that the CDC publishes: 
1) Employees should wash their hands as soon as feasible 
following contact with blood or other infectious diseases.54
2) Contaminated needles and other contaminated sharps shall not 
be bent or recapped unless the employer can demonstrate that no 
alternative is feasible.55
3) Contaminated needles shall be disposed of in puncture resistant 
containers.56
4) An employer shall have an exposure control plan in place and 
update it annually.57
When the precautions are followed there is an extraordinarily small possibility of 
transmission.  In July 1991, the CDC acknowledged that HIV infected healthcare workers 
generally pose no risk of transmitting HIV if universal precautions are followed.58  The CDC 
indirectly asserted that when the workplace adopts a policy of universal precautions, the 
probability of transmission is virtually eliminated.59
B. Statistics on Occupational Transmission
The crucial question that is posed to society is if a HIV positive public safety or health care 
employee endangers the life of a person that they assist.  In July 1991, the CDC acknowledged 
that an HIV infected healthcare worker posed no risk of transmission to a patient if the worker 
7adhered to universal precautions and did not perform invasive procedures.60  Realistically, it is 
quite improbable for a healthcare or public safety employee to infect a patient.  
Studies have shown that a vast majority of occupational transmissions of HIV occur through 
needle sticks, that is a healthcare or public safety employee administers an injection.  Therefore 
for a healthcare or public safety employee to infect by this means a patient or victim the worker 
would first have to stick themselves with a needle and then use the contaminated needle and 
poke the person assisted.  To transmit the infection otherwise would require a similarly 
extraordinary combination of events such as a worker cutting himself and then bleeding directly 
into the open wound of the person assisted. 
The improbability of occupational transmission to a patient or victim is evidenced by the fact 
that there are only six reported patients who have contacted HIV from a healthcare worker or a 
public safety employee since the beginning of the epidemic twenty years ago. Only one 
healthcare worker, Dr. Acer, a dentist practicing in the state of Florida, infected all six patients.  
After the state investigated it was reported that Dr. Acer did not use the recommended universal 
precautions.  In addition, his office had no written policy for sterilizing dental instruments and 
equipment.61  The observer is left with the impression that something extremely untoward and 
outside the realm of normal medical practice occurred in these six cases.
Many more HIV transmissions have occurred from patient to health care and public safety 
employee than from health care worker /public safety employee to persons assisted.  In the 
twenty years of the epidemic, there have been ninety-three reported cases of HIV transmissions 
from a person being assisted to a health care worker or public safety employee. 62  Fifty-six 
percent of the ninety-three transmissions have been to health care workers.  Most occur through 
contaminated “needle stick” injury.63  This usually occurs after the health care employee has 
8treated the patient and is disposing of the needle.64  It is less likely that an assisted person would 
contract the disease from a public safety worker.  Logically, the public safety employee would 
first have to puncture or cut himself or herself to transmit the disease to an assisted person.  
While the CDC acknowledges that some cases may go unreported, it is reasonably safe to 
conclude that the number of transmissions to health care and public safety workers establishes a 
benchmark for the outer limit of transmissions to patients and victims. 65  The author will assume 
for purposes of analysis that there have been ninety-three transmissions to patients and victims 
during the twenty-year course of the epidemic.
The risk of contracting HIV from a health care or public safety employee is staggeringly 
small when one considers the number of employees in public safety and health care professions 
and the number of people they are assisting.  The Department of Labor statistics indicate that 
there are 599,550 police officers66, 275,730 firefighters67, 170,690 paramedics68, and 8,972,73069
healthcare workers (dentists, lab workers, physicians, nurses) working in the United States in 
2001.  To arrive at the risk to date, the number of reported transmissions (ninety-three) is divided 
by the number of possible transmissions that could occur between a professional and a person 
assisted.  To obtain the potential number of transmissions, the total number of employees is 
multiplied by the number of average contacts the employee has with the general public a day, 
this figure is then multiplied by the number of days in a year (365), which is multiplied by 
twenty years.  To calculate the number of contacts an employee has with the public, a variety of 
sources were used.  In a report published by the United States Department of Justice it was stated 
that police officers have nearly 45 million face-to-face contacts with civilians in a year.70  Using 
the number of contacts (45 million) and dividing that number of police ((599,550) gives the 
approximate number of contacts per year per police officer as 75.  To estimate the number of 
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estimated number of fire and EMS calls made in the United States is approximately 8,453,854.71
Using this number divided by the number of fire and EMS workers in the United States 
(446,420) calculates to an average of 19 contacts per year per worker.  D. Underwood is an 
ophthalmologist who conducted a case study that included the number of interaction between 
nine doctors and their patients.  Using Dr. Underwood’s study, an average of thirty-two patients 
a day is seen per practitioner. 72
Using these figures, the risk of a patient or victim contracting HIV in an encounter with a 
health care professional or public safety worker is estimated to be four out of every hundred 
billion contacts.73  This estimate represents the outer limit of the risk that exists, because it 
represents the risk of transmitting HIV from a person assisted to a health care or public safety 
worker, which is greater than the risk of transmission from a worker to a person assisted.  The 
actual risk may be much lower and may be 6/93rds of this figure (the ratio of the reported 
transmissions in each direction) or 2.6 transmissions out of every trillion contacts.  The risk of 
transmission is so vanishingly small, but yet the courts have held that public safety and health 
care workers present a significant risk and should not practice in their occupations.74
The ratio above indicates the low risk that is present from public safety and healthcare 
employees to persons they are assisting.  An article published by the American Bar Association 
in 1988 addressed the pending issue of probability of transmission from health care worker to 
patient.75  The article emphasized the low risk of HIV transmission in the relationship.  The 
article argues that it would be unwise and unnecessary to restrict the job performance of health 
care workers because of the nominal risk.76  Comparatively, the national weather service 
estimates the odds of being struck by lightning in the U.S. is one in 615,000. 77  Americans 
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routinely are outside during electrical storms without worrying about being struck by lightening.  
Yet, there is a much higher likelihood of being struck by lightning than contracting HIV whne 
being treated by public safety or health care employee.  There is an inherent risk in every human 
activity but at some point it becomes so slight that it is considered inconsequential.
III. STATUTES
Anti-Discrimination Legislation:  Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Americans 
with Disabilities Act
The question that is posed to the courts, is whether a public safety employee who is infected 
with HIV or AIDS poses a direct threat to others, which cannot be eliminated by reasonable 
accommodation.  There are two statutory bodies of law that protect employees who are disabled 
from workplace discrimination. Public safety employees and healthcare workers fall under the 
protection of the statutes that are discussed below.
 The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act)78 protects HIV infected 
individuals from discrimination.  Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act protects “otherwise 
qualified” handicapped individuals (now “individuals with a disability”) from discrimination 
“under any program or activity receiving financial assistance.”79  “Otherwise qualified” limits 
coverage by requiring that individual in question be able to perform the essential functions of the 
job.  In 1974, the definition of an individual with a disability was expanded:  “any person who (i) 
has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such a person’s 
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an 
impairment.”80  To be considered disabled under the Act, the individual must be substantially 
limited as to a major life activity.81  Major life activities are functions such as caring for one’s 
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, and working.”82
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In 1991, Congress passed the ADA, which expands the coverage offered under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibiting private employers that have fifteen or more employees 
from discriminating against the disabled.83  The ADA parallels the Rehabilitation Act in that it 
uses much of the same language in the legislation.  Under the ADA the definition of a disability 
is identical to the Rehabilitation Act.  A disability is considered:  a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more life activities, or the disability has been of 
record, or the individual is perceived as being impaired.84
The ADA provides, 
“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 85
Aside from that the ADA expands coverage to privately employed individuals there are some 
additional differences between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.  The Rehabilitation Act 
inquires as to whether there is a significant risk as an element of qualification. The ADA, in
addition, inquires as to if there is a direct threat to others that cannot be eliminated through 
reasonable accommodations.86  Both of the statutes protect individuals that are otherwise 
qualified from discrimination in employment settings.  Several circuits have interpreted the two 
to be synonymous.87  The ADA expressly provides that “nothing [herein] shall be construed to 
apply to a lesser standard than…under …the Rehabilitation Act…or the regulations issued 
…pursuant to [it].”88  Another difference is that the Rehabilitation Act includes a non-exhaustive 
list of major life activities that a disability may impair.  Under the ADA, there is no inclusive or 
exclusive list.  This enables the ADA to provide extensive coverage for individuals with 
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disabilities.  The 101st Congress stated that one of the objectives of passing the Act was to 
protect individuals with HIV.89
Administrative agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) view the ADA as covering all stages of HIV infection.  The 
EEOC stated, “… impairments such as HIV infection are inherently limiting.”90  The DOJ 
explicitly includes HIV as a disability in its regulations.  The question arises if an asymptomatic 
individual is considered disabled?  If they are disabled then they are entitled to ADA protection.  
The DOJ notes that the phrase, ‘symptomatic or asymptomatic’ was inserted in response to those 
that thought clarification was necessary. 
The United States Supreme Court recently limited the ADA’s coverage.  In Chevron USA 
Inc. v. Echazabal,91 the Court ruled that if hiring an individual would pose a direct threat to 
themselves an employer may refuse to hire the individual without violating the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.92  Effectively, that means an employer not only has the defense that an 
employee may pose a threat to others but also that the employee may pose a threat to themselves.  
This is an issue that will not be significantly addressed in this note.
The ADA and Rehabilitation Act offer protection to individuals who have disabilities but can 
perform the essential functions of a job.93  The courts’ interpretation of the requirements of the 
statutes has often left individuals with HIV without adequate protection.94
IV. TWO LEADING CASES
A. Asymptomatic HIV as a disability under Bragdon v. Abbott
In 1998, the landmark case, Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court raised several issues involving 
AIDS as a disability.95 The first issue is does a disability under the ADA include asymptomatic 
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HIV?  The second issue is may a health care professional refuse treatment because of the direct 
threat the patient poses to the health and safety of others?
 The facts are as follows.  Sidney Abbot went to the office of Dr. Randon Bragdon for a 
dentist appointment.96  On the preliminary medical form she disclosed that she was HIV 
positive.97  After finding a cavity, Dr. Bragdon informed her that he could not fill the cavity in 
his office but would perform the procedure in the hospital due to her HIV status.98  Abbott sued 
Bragdon under the ADA.  The applicable provision of the statute99 provides that 
“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full 
and equal employment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any person who operates a place of public 
accommodation.”100
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Abbot.  101   It held an HIV positive 
person is afforded the protection under the ADA.102 The First Circuit affirmed, restating the 
premise that the “Rehabilitation act does not require the hiring of a person who posed a direct 
threat of communicating an infectious disease to others.”103  The issue was if Bragdon could 
refuse treatment to Abbott based on the threat she posed.104  Under the ADA standards, Bragdon 
could refuse treatment if Abbott’s disability “posed a direct threat to the health or safety of 
others.”105
The definition for direct threat under the ADA is “a significant risk to the health and safety of 
others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the 
provision of auxiliary aids or services.”106  The court held that objective medical evidence along 
with the judgment of a health care professional should determine if a significant risk is 
14
present.107  The court, however, did not cite sufficient material in the record that an HIV positive 
individual posed no direct threat to the health and safety of others.108
The Supreme Court first assessed if the HIV infection was a disability under the ADA.109
The Court held that it was a disability.110  In answering the question the Court assessed three 
questions.  First, was the HIV infection a physical impairment.111  The second issue, if the life 
activity that respondent relies upon is considered a major life activity under the ADA.112  Finally, 
the Court asks if the impairment substantially limits the major life activity.113
The Court conceded that every agency that has considered the issue of HIV infected persons 
being covered under the ADA has found that they are protected.114  In addition every court that 
had been presented with the question if an asymptomatic HIV individual is covered under the 
ADA answered in the positive.115
Plaintiff claimed that having HIV substantially limited a major life activity, namely 
pregnancy.  The Court stated that, “In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to 
damage the infected persons white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we hold it is an 
impairment from the moment of infection.”116  The Court held that becoming pregnant and 
giving birth were major life activities.117  The Court stated that contrary to Bragdon’s contention 
that the ADA only covers public activities, ADA covers private activities, such as caring for 
one’s self.118  Because of the lethal outcome of AIDS and significant possibility of transmitting 
the disease to her husband (through sexual intercourse) and child (through conception) the 
Supreme Court held in favor of plaintiff.119
The Court reviewed another question asking if a private health care provider must perform 
invasive procedures on infectious patients in his office and if courts should defer to the health 
care provider’s professional judgment?120  The Court considered substantial testimony from a 
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number of health experts indicating that it is safe to treat patients infected with HIV in dental 
offices.121  Bragdon asserted that the use of high-speed drills and surface cooling with water 
created a risk of airborne HIV transmission.122  The Court concluded that the study on which 
Bragdon relied was inconclusive.123
The Court’s opinion demonstrates that respondent’s HIV infection falls within ADA’s 
definition of disability.  The Supreme Court remanded back the Court of Appeals so that 
Bragdon could produce evidence proving that Abbott posed a significant risk of transmitting 
HIV.  On remand the Court of Appeals held that a dentist’s cavity filling procedure on a patient 
does not pose a direct threat to others.124
B. Arline: The four prong test
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, the Supreme Court first determined that a 
person suffering from a contagious disease can be disabled within the meaning of § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act.125  In the case a teacher was fired from her job because of her tuberculosis 
infection.126  The termination occurred after her third relapse of tuberculosis within two years.127
After she was denied relief in state administrative proceedings she brought suit in federal court.  
Her claim was that her termination constituted a violation of the § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  
The trial court found it “difficult to conceive that Congress intended contagious diseases to 
be included within the definition of a handicapped person.”128  The court held that even if a 
person with an infectious disease could be considered a handicapped person, Arline was not 
qualified to teach.129
The Court of Appeals reversed.130  They held that “persons with contagious diseases are 
within the coverage of section § 504.”131  They also held that Arline fit neatly into the statutory 
and regulatory framework of the Act.132  The court remanded the case to determine if the risks of 
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the infection precluded Arline from being otherwise qualified for the job and if it was possible to 
make reasonable accommodations for her.133
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  When determining if a particular individual is 
handicapped as defined by the Act they looked to the regulations that are published by the 
Department of Health and Human Services.134  The Court discussed the legislative history of § 
504.  The Court stated that “history demonstrates that Congress was as concerned about the 
effect on an impairment on others as it was about its effect on the individual.”  Using history and 
regulations the Court held that allowing discrimination because a disease is contagious is 
inconsistent with the purpose of § 504.135
The remaining question is whether Arline is otherwise qualified for the job of an elementary 
school teacher.  The Court stated that an individualized inquiry must be made in most cases.136
This case set forth a four-factor test that need to be considered when conducting an inquiry.137
The four factors include the nature, duration, severity of the risk, and the probability that the 
disease will be transmitted.138  In Arline the Court held that a person with an infectious disease 
“who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease is not otherwise qualified 
to perform his or her job.”139  A risk assessment must also be made as to whether the employer 
could reasonably accommodate the employee.140  The court in making the assessment should 
defer to reasonable medical judgments of public health officials.141
C. Controversial Phrases
The controversial statement in Arline that so many courts have applied in different ways 
is, “a person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the 
workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not 
eliminate the risk.”142  The real question is what constitutes a significant risk?  Significance is 
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not controlled by seriousness of the harm.  This is because significance relates to probability 
which is determined by an individualized inquiry.  From Arline one can infer that the probability 
that the risk will occur is the real meaning behind the phrase significant risk.143  Federal courts 
disagree about what the probability must be to be considered a significant risk.  The Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have followed a cautious rule.  These courts hold that a theoretical 
possibility of transmitting AIDS is a sufficient showing of a “significant risk”.  Their view is 
that, “when transmitting a disease inevitably causes death the evidence supports a finding of 
significant risk if it shows both a certain event can occur and that according to medical opinion 
that event can transmit the disease.”144  This risk is not based on a medical opinions or evidence, 
but on theory and fear.
Conversely, the First Circuit has construed the phrase significant risk to mean that there is 
more than a possibility of some danger.145 In Bragdon as discussed in the prior section, Dr. 
Bragdon refused services to an HIV infected individual.  The Supreme Court affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of the HIV infected individual.  The Court stated that “Dr. Bragdon is not 
entitled to absolute safety.”146  The Supreme Court’s disposition on the issue transmission of 
HIV is that there must be a significant risk for an individual not to be protected by the ADA or § 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  There are several circuits and district courts that do not follow the 
Court’s reasoning.
V.  CASE LAW UNSUPPORTIVE OF HIV INFECTED PUBLIC SAFETY AND 
HEALTHCARE WORKERS.
A. Health Care
1. Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center
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Regardless of the medical evidence, courts feed on the stigma surrounding AIDS.  They 
are especially reluctant in healthcare cases to follow the guidance set forth under the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.  In Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center,147 the court 
failed to make a sound judicial analysis when a surgical technician was terminated from his 
position upon his employer discovering that he had AIDS.  Before terminating Mauro, 
Borgess organized a task force to determine if a HIV-positive employee could safely perform 
the job responsibilities of a surgical technician.148  The committee determined that Mauro 
could not perform the essential job functions of a surgical technician if HIV-positive.  The 
district court granted Borgess’ motion for summary judgment, relying on the four factors laid 
out in Arline.149  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed holding that Mauro was not otherwise 
a qualified individual under the ADA.150
Judge Boggs dissented, vigorously contending that a “significant risk” means, by process 
of elimination, a small risk that is not harmful.151  The court failed to follow the Supreme 
Court’s instruction to consider the probability of infection of contagious disease152 and did 
not make an individualized inquiry as Arline requires.  Arline specifically states that there 
must be a direct threat or significant risk for the employee not to be protected by the 
Rehabilitation Act.  
In addition the court did not take into account Mauro’s expert witnesses, even though 
they were both physicians.  The majority held that a surgical technician may be required to 
participate in exposure prone procedures.  The court simply concluded that some risk existed, 
therefore Mauro was not qualified.  By contrast, Judge Boggs recognizes that the ADA 
requires a legal assessment not “a sense of what we would prefer as an employer or 
patient.”153  He notes that the standard of significant risk means that employers may be 
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required to expose their patients or others to some amount of risk.  Judge Boggs states, “In 
some way, Mauro poses some risk.  It is not ontologically impossible for him to transmit a 
disease of very great lethality.  However, the chance that he will do so to any given patient is 
‘small.’”154  Boggs points out that the court confuses exposure prone procedures with 
invasive procedures.  Mauro attested simply that “Usually if I had my hands near the wound, 
it would be like, on an abdominal incision, to kind of put your finger in and hold – kind of 
pull down on the muscle tissue and …pull that back.”155  There was no testimony that Mauro 
ever performed any procedures that would be considered exposure prone.  Under these 
circumstances, Judge Boggs concluded that it would be more appropriate for a jury to make 
the decision whether Mauro posed a significant risk of transmitting HIV to others.156
Unlike the court, Judge Boggs attempts to precisely address the significance of the risk.  
“The CDC has estimated that the risk to a single patient from an HIV-positive surgeon ranges 
from .0024% (1 in 42,000 procedures) to .00024% (1 in 417,000 procedures).”157  Mauro was 
a surgical technician who only touched the wound marginally, if at all.  Thus Mauro most 
probably would pose a lower risk than a surgeon, who only poses a risk ranging from .0024% 
to .00024%.158  Boggs points out that there is a degree of risk to almost every action.  “[The] 
perception of the significance of risk is subjective.  More than a few people refuse to fly, 
though commercial airlines are said to be safe compared to other modes of transportation.  
There may be some people who refuse to cross streets.  Others go bungee – jumping.  So 
there is an inescapabley normative component to the judgment of whether the chance that 
even a great peril will come to pass is ‘significant’ or not.”159
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Is this considered significant under the ADA standards?  There is no clear answer because 
the Mauro Court did not define significant risk.  Instead, the court reacted to fear and misguided 
apprehension.
Another Sixth Circuit ruling decided the same year is EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Market Inc.160
The case concerned an HIV – positive individual, and although not in the public safety or 
healthcare sector, illustrates the fear of the court.  The individual the EEOC represented was 
Steven Sharp, a produce worker at Prevo’s Market.161  Sharp voluntarily disclosed that he was 
HIV positive.162  Consequently, he was reassigned to the cash room.163  Sharp initially was 
satisfied with the re-assignment.164  But shortly, after reassignment he complained of unwanted 
questions by fellow employees and no contact with customers.165  He was granted paid leave and 
was requested to get a medical exam.166 Sharp did not go to Prevo’s doctors, instead preferring 
to go to his own.167  This was not satisfactory to Prevo’s Market, and Sharp was dismissed from 
his position ten months later.168   The court found that the job presented a grave enough of a risk 
that it was a necessity to require a medical examination mandated by the employer.169  The court 
also held that it was lawful to reassign an employee without any objective evidence that the 
employee was a direct threat to others.170
The majority asserted that it was a business necessity that Sharp went for a medical 
examination.  However, the ADA provides that a covered entity shall not require a medical 
examination unless it is shown to be job related and consistent with a business necessity.171  A 
recognized legitimate business practice according to the ADA is as follows: “1) when an 
employee is having difficulty performing his or her job effectively; 2) when an employee 
becomes disabled on the job or wishes to return to work after suffering an illness; 3) if an 
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employee requests an accommodation; and 4) if medical examination, screening, and monitoring 
is required by other laws.”172  Sharp does not fit any of the scenarios.  
Judge Moore, dissented and indicated the flaws in the majority’s opinion.173  She analogized 
the majority’s opinion to treatment of blacks in the 1940’s.174  She held that the majority’s 
opinion would only fuel unfounded fear, prejudice, ignorance, and myth.175  Judge Moore also 
cited to Center of Disease Control (CDC), asserting neither HIV nor AIDS has ever appeared on 
the list of infectious diseases that could be transmitted through the handling of food.176  The next 
major flaw in the majority’s opinion is that after the grocery store re-assigned Sharp, it lawfully 
could not require a medical examination because it did not satisfy a business purpose.177  The 
problem with the majority’s opinion is that the very purpose of the ADA is to eliminate 
discrimination and exclusions that have no supporting evidence.  The dissent also states that the 
probability of Sharp infecting a fellow produce worker was one in ten million under normal 
circumstances.178  If there is direct contact then the risk of transmission increases to one in forty 
thousand to one in four hundred thousand depending on the study.179  From the statistical data, 
there is no direct threat and even if there were, Sharp could still be a qualified worker if he could 
be reasonably accommodated.  This could be done by providing Sharp his own knives and giving 
him gloves to wear.180  The dissent points out that the majority singles out Sharp, but fails to 
acknowledge that using bloody knives is a risk for all blood borne pathogens.181  Prevo’s should 
have adopted universal safety procedures.182  Moore’s dissent condemns the majority opinion 
“[in] that it allows employers to elevate fear over facts, ignorance over information, and 
mythology over medicine.”183
2. Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center
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In Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 184 the Fifth Circuit 
similarly engages in a conclusionary analysis that a small risk is a significant risk.  Bradley, also 
a surgical technician, was infected with the HIV virus.  When his infection became known to the 
hospital, they re-assigned him to assist in the purchasing department.185  Bradley claimed that his 
reassignment violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendant and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  
The court purported to follow Arline’s four-part test.  The court referred to the guidelines 
provided by the CDC but failed to heed to them.  The CDC states that “the risk of transmitting 
HBV (Hepatitis B virus) from an infected HCW (health care worker) is small, and the risk of 
transmitting HIV is likely to be even smaller.”186 The court admitted that the risk of transmission 
was minimal but they claimed that it is still significant.187  The court was in agreement with the 
hospital that there was no reasonable accommodation that could be made for Bradley.188  The 
hospital claimed that Bradley even being in the operating room was too grave of a risk for the 
hospital and its patients.189  The court concluded that Bradley’s HIV-positive status gave the 
hospital grounds to reassign him.190  The Fifth Circuit did not give deference to reasonable 
medical judgments of public health officers at the CDC.
3. Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation
Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation191 involved a resident in 
neurosurgery who was infected with the HIV virus and filed suit against the University of 
Maryland for violating the Rehabilitation Act and ADA.  Doe was stuck with an HIV 
contaminated needle while under the employment of the hospital.192  He subsequently tested 
positive for the HIV virus.193  The hospital after learning of Doe’s condition consulted a panel of 
experts.194  The panel suggested that Doe be able to continue in his position with the exception of 
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not performing one procedure that included wire.195  The hospital did not take the advice of its 
own panel, instead offering Doe alternative positions in non-surgical fields.196  When Doe 
refused to accept another position the hospital terminated him.197
In the words of the district court, Arline factors “discount [] the severity of anticipated harms 
by the statistical probability that they will occur.” 198  Arguably, the court itself admitted that it 
did not follow a leading Supreme Court decision.  The factors the court looked at were heavily 
based on emotion, not the law.  In the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, the court stated “[there] may 
presently be no documented case of surgeon to patient transmission, but such a transmission is 
clearly possible.”199  The ADA and Arline, the two guiding bodies of law, do not define 
“significant risk” or a “direct threat” as just a possibility.  As Doe argued the risk cannot be so 
infinitesimal and still be considered a significant risk.200  The hospital admitted that the risk of 
transmission was small and quoted the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) but 
would not follow CDC guidelines.201  The CDC suggests that surgeons should be allowed to 
practice invasive procedures but that a hospital may bar HIV-positive surgeons from exposure 
prone procedures.  The court’s opinion cited to the possibility of a surgeon cutting himself with a 
sharp instrument and then bleeding directly into the patient’s wound.202  The court declared that 
there was a possibility of transmission by Doe to a patient that constituted a grave enough risk.203
The court held that the hospital was not in violation of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.  
4. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc
A recent decision in the Eleventh Circuit, Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc, 
concerned a dental hygienist who was HIV-positive and was terminated because he could not be 
reasonably accommodated in accordance with the ADA.204  Spencer Waddell was employed by 
Valley Forge from early 1996 through October 1997.205  In September of 1997, Dr. Bhat tested 
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Waddell to determine if he carried the HIV virus.206  Waddell was notified shortly afterward that 
he did indeed test positive for the virus.207  Valley Forge placed Waddell on paid leave while 
they determined what his future would be at Valley Forge.208  After Valley Forge studied 
medical journals they determined that Waddell posed a significant risk and he could no longer 
work as a dental hygienist.209  He was offered a clerical job at half the salary of dental 
hygienist.210  Waddell refused the position.211
Subsequently he brought suit and sought relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.212
Both Waddell and Valley Forge filed for summary judgment.213  Valley Forge admitted that 
Waddell’s termination resulted solely from his status has being HIV positive.214  The district 
court found that Waddell’s job entailed “exposure prone” procedures.215  The district court ruled 
in favor of Valley Forge’s summary judgment.  The court held that Waddell posed a direct threat 
to others following the standard set forth in Onishea v. Hopper.216 Onishea elaborated on the 
meaning of a significant risk.  The Eleventh Circuit held that evidence supports a finding of 
significant risk if it shows that both a significant event can occur and that according to reliable 
medical opinions the event can transmit the disease.217  The court notes that even if the 
probability of transmission if low, death itself makes the risk significant.218
The appellate court in Waddell held that the district court properly granted summary 
judgment to Valley Forge because Waddell posed a significant risk of HIV transmission.219  The 
Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision.  The district court had concentrated on 
the fourth factor in Arline – the probability of HIV transmission between a dental hygienist and a 
patient.220  Reviewing several factors such as the proximity of sharp objects and flesh led the 
appellate court to determine that there was no reasonable accommodation that could be made for 
Waddell.221
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The appellate court, however, only discusses a theoretical possibility; it never considers the 
probability of an actual occurrence.  The risk was admittedly small.  Waddell’s medical expert 
attested to the fact that the, “hygienist’s fingers and dental instruments are rarely in the patient’s 
mouth at the same time.”222  The opinion discusses the possibility of blood-to-blood contact 
between Waddell and patient.223  According to the law it has to be a significant possibility not 
just a “possibility”.224  The Eleventh Circuit, like many courts addressing the issue purported to 
address the fourth factor of Arline, the probability of HIV transmission between a dental 
hygienist and patient.  The court conceded that “Waddell performed some procedures that 
entailed the use of sharp instruments, there was a risk that he could cut or prick himself and 
bleed into an open wound …”.225  The court in effect holds that some risk constitutes a 
significant risk.  
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision conflicts with preceding authority of Bragdon and Arline.  In 
Bragdon the Court held that courts should defer to agency interpretations.226  The court in 
Waddell does not rely on medical experts in forming its opinion.  Waddell presented two 
appellate court amicus briefs from American Dental Association and National Alliance of State 
and Territorial AIDS Directors in favor of his position.  Additionally, The Infectious Diseases 
Society and American Dental Association of America (IDSA) filed briefs with the U.S. Supreme 
Court.227  All four briefs support the Waddell’s claim that he did not pose a significant risk of 
transmission when universal precautions are used.228 IDSA and CSTE argue that “Such 
determinations by the 11th Circuit and other federal appeals courts are creating the incorrect 
presumption that defendants in the position of dental practice here can claim the ‘direct threat’ 
defense to an ADA suit against them until there is absolutely zero risk of disease 
transmission.”229
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Comparing Waddell to Bragdon the results are not consistent.  In Bragdon the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that Abbott, the HIV infected was protected under the ADA.  Statistically the risk is 
greater from patient to healthcare worker than from healthcare worker to patient.  The 
instruments and general procedures, which are involved in both cases are similar.  Bragdon was 
filling a cavity and Waddell customarily cleaned teeth.  The holding in Waddell, denying the 
healthcare provider protection under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act is inconsistent with 
medical evidence and prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions.  If the Eleventh Circuit had followed 
precedent the district court’s ruling would have been reversed.  
Fire
1. Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby
Mandatory testing for the HIV virus is an issue that is prevalent in employment.  Its 
legitimacy depends on the probability of transmission, in the particular employment setting.  A 
case that involves this issue is Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby.230  Plaintiff, a fireman 
and paramedic was transported without any prior notice to a lab that tested for HIV.  He objected 
to the test but was told that it was mandatory.  The district court addressed the issue if mandatory 
testing for HIV violated the Fourth Amendment.  The city argued that mandatory testing is 
proper because “AIDS is an epidemic and firefighters and paramedics are high-risk employees 
and are at risk to contract and or transmit the AIDS in their line of duty.”231  Plaintiff’s position 
was that this non-consensual taking of blood is an unreasonable search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.232  The city responded that because the blood was drawn in annual physical 
examination they did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Dr. Leonard Calabrese, an expert 
witness for the plaintiff, viewed the occupational risk for firefighters as well as health care 
providers to be low for transmitting or being infected by the HIV virus.  Dr. Michael Lederman, 
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another expert witness agreed. 233  The expert witnesses for the defendants stated that universal 
precautions are not practical and therefore HIV infected firefighters pose a significant risk to the 
public.234
The district court held that mandatory testing of firemen and paramedics for HIV was legal.  
The court agreed with defendant’s expert witnesses that universal precautions were not practical.  
It held that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment because not all searches are 
unreasonable.  Testing firefighters infringed on minimal privacy interests and therefore was 
considered reasonable by this court.  Finally, the court rationalized that because the high-risk 
nature of the work mandatory AIDS testing was legal.235
From an objective stance, this does not seem logical.  The district court does not realistically 
view the probability that a transmission would occur, only the harm that would occur if it did.  
Universal precautions must be in place according to the law.  If universal precautions are not in 
place, logically then all public safety and heath care workers themselves are at risk of being 
infected by a person that they assist.  Firefighters and health care workers themselves need to be 
protected from blood born pathogens.  The more significant effect that mandatory AIDS testing 
has is that it does not encourage the use of universal precautions.  It feeds the stigma associated 
with AIDS in that it fosters the belief that HIV is transmitted by casual contact.  
VI. CASE LAW SUPPORTING HIV INFECTED PUBLIC SAFETY AND 
HEALTHCARE WORKERS.
A. Healthcare
1. Joe Doe v. Oregon Resorts
A different scenario is a case where a man’s wife was infected with the AIDS virus and he 
worked on the ski patrol.  In Joe Doe v. Oregon Resorts,236 the employer alleged that Doe posed 
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a significant risk to others because of his risk of being HIV-positive.  The risk was his 
association with his HIV infected wife and the possibility of him contracting the disease and then 
exposing others to the disease.237  Oregon Resorts mandated that Doe be tested in order to keep 
his job has a ski patrolman.238  The duties of ski patrol are to assist other medical personnel such 
as intermediate level EMTs and physicians on the mountain.239  These duties may also include 
collecting needles when cleaning up an area.240  Ski patrol are not allowed to incubate, start IVs, 
or perform injections.241  They also may not perform other invasive procedures.242
This case deals with discrimination by association.  The district court held that the employer 
violated the ADA when it transferred ski patroller, Joe Doe to another position.243  The court 
followed Arline.  The court emphasized analyzing the fourth prong of the test, probability of 
transmission.244  Relying on expert witnesses, Dr. Mark Loveless, the court found the risk to be 
insignificant.245  Dr. Loveless noted the extensive studies conducted on HIV and its 
transmission.246  To help illustrate the improbability of Joe Doe transmitting the disease through 
his ski patrol activities, the doctor noted, “[that] plaintiff’s risk of contracting HIV from his wife 
through a single sexual episode was low.”247  Another expert witness, Dr. Chunn “acknowledged 
that even when health care providers are providing care involving deep body cavity work where 
the employer’s hands are not visible, studies have shown that transmission is rare.”248
Admittedly, this case differs from Mauro or Doe v. Medical Corps., because Joe Doe 
position did not require him to use needles, administer IVs, or engage in invasive procedures.  
Joe Doe, however, still came into contact with bleeding wounds and faced extreme and 
dangerous conditions.249  Nevertheless the district court followed the guidelines set forth in 
Arline, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act.  The court deferred to the knowledge of doctors 
who have studied the risk of transmission of HIV.250  The court also disclosed that there was a 
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possibility of transmission, but the possibility was so low that it [did] not constitute a “significant 
risk”.251  In addition, if universal precautions are utilized the statistical the risk becomes 
infinitesimal.  Doe was entitled to reinstatement to his position as ski patrolman.252
B. Fire
1. Doe v. District of Columbia
In Doe v. District of Columbia,253 the court held that applicant John Doe, established a prima 
facie case under the ADA.  Doe applied for a position with the District of Columbia’s fire 
department as a firefighter.254  A physical exam was given and if the applicant passed the exam 
they were acknowledged to be fully capable of performing the duties of a firefighter without risk 
to themselves or others.255   Doe passed the exam and was sent a letter of appointment.256  The 
letter stated that Doe was on probationary status during his first year and if there was any 
derogatory information that was found he would be terminated.257  Fearful that his HIV-positive 
status would be discovered, he called an official at the fire department and disclosed that he was 
infected with the disease.258  He was told not to report for duty.259  He was never told that the 
decision to hire him was rescinded nor was he told to come into work.260  Doe thereinafter sued 
the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983261 and the Rehabilitation Act.262
The district court held that the city violated the Rehabilitation Act.263  The district court 
reassured that the firefighters wear protective gear when they are performing their job 
responsibilities.264  The gear includes a helmet, hood, bunker coat, bunker pants, gloves, and 
bunker boots.265  These are all made of heavy, thick material.  An expert witness, Dr. Parenti, 
Associate Professor of Medicine in the Division of Infectious Disease at George Washington 
University Medical Center in Washington, D.C., testified that an asymptomatic HIV-positive 
person has no impairment of their physical capabilities such as their strength, agility, or ability to 
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breathe.266  It is difficult to transfer the HIV virus.  This is reflected by the low percentage of 
health care workers that have contracted the disease on the job.267  According to Dr. Parenti 
“there is ‘no measurable’ risk that the disease will be transmitted through performance of fire 
fighting duties…”268  He equated the possibility of transmitting the disease while on the job with 
the probability of “getting struck by meteor while walking down Constitution Avenue in 
Washington D.C.”269  He is supported by Katherine West, a certified nurse in the specialty of 
infection control at the Association for Practitioners in Infection Control.270  She is employed at 
the George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences in Washington 
D.C..271  She testified that all the protective gear that the firefighters utilize eliminates the risk of 
blood-to-blood contact.  She is quoted as saying that the risk of HIV transmission is “so remote” 
and “extremely small.”272  She also attested to the fact that several fire departments throughout 
the United States employ HIV-positive firefighters in active-duty status.273  In addition there are 
no reported cases of HIV transmission during the course of fire fighting duties.274  Both Dr. 
Parenti and Ms. West find that an HIV-infected person poses no measurable risk of transmitting 
the disease through the performance of fire fighting duties.275
The district found Doe passed the physical examination and was able to do the job 
sufficiently before the city found out that Doe was HIV-positive.276  Doe’s HIV status did not 
impair his ability to perform his duties has a firefighter. The district court followed the guidelines 
of Arline and deferred to the experts.277  It emphasized that the testimony was uncontested.  The 
evidence supported the court’s finding that an HIV asymptomatic firefighter poses no 
measurable risk of transmitting the disease.278  The defense failed to rebut Doe’s prima facie 
showing that he was discriminated against because of his HIV-positive status.279  The Court 
ordered that Doe be reinstated, that the city pay him back - pay with interest, and compensatory 
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damages of $25,000 and attorney fees and court costs.280  The court gave a very strong statement 
about fostering fear and misguided apprehension.  
“In the context of race the Supreme Court, has warned:
The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.  
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or 
indirectly give them effect.   ‘Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution 
may not avoid a constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of 
private racial prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply held.’”281
C. Police
1. Holiday v. City of Chattanooga
Holiday v. City of Chattanooga,282 involved a police officer who was denied employment 
with the city solely because he was HIV-positive.  In 1993, Holiday submitted an application to 
the City for employment in their police department he subsequently took a written examination 
and completed a physical agility test.283  He was invited for an interview, and granted a 
conditional offer of employment subject to a physical and psychological exam.284  During the 
exam, Holiday voluntarily told the doctor that he had been diagnosed with HIV and was 
anemic.285  The doctor told him that he passed the exam.286  However, the doctor called the 
police department and informed them that Holiday had failed the physical.287  The doctor said 
Holiday was weak and unable to perform the work.288  However, in actuality he was 
asymptomatic.289  Plaintiff, Louis Holiday brought suit against the City of Chattanooga under the 
ADA, charging that the city refused to hire him as a police officer because he was infected with 
HIV.290
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The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment.291  It held that Holiday 
did not show that he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job.292  The 
Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo.  The court of appeals found that 
the district court made no individualized inquiry regarding Holiday.293  The ADA mandates an 
individualized inquiry in determining whether an employee’s disability or other condition 
disqualifies him from a particular position.294  There was no evidence that proved that Holiday 
could not perform the job properly.295  He was asymptomatic at the time of his physical 
examination with Dr. Dowlen.296  At the time of the examination, Dr. Dowlen made no 
assessments as to if Holiday was experiencing any fatique, sluggishness, or shortness of 
breath.297  The Sixth Circuit held that granting summary judgment was improper because there 
existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Holiday was otherwise qualified to perform 
the essential functions of a police officer.  When Holiday inquired why he was hired the city’s 
office administer told him that she could not, “put other employee’s at risk by hiring [him].”298
This emphasizes the point that the job offer was contingent on Holiday’s HIV status. The city’s 
conclusion had no medical support. At the court of appeals, the city changed its position 
conceding that the Holiday posed no threat to the health and safety of others.299
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.300  The Sixth 
Circuit held that Holiday was entitled to be evaluated on his abilities and relevant medical 
evidence rather than on fear, ignorance, or misconceptions.301  They also found that Holiday 
adduced sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that City refused to hire him 
because he was HIV-positive.302
Comparatively, the Sixth Circuit did not make the same type of review and analysis in Mauro 
v. Borgess Medical Center as they did in Holiday.  Both Mauro and Holiday argued that their 
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respective district courts erred in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact.303
In Holiday, the court went through a systematic analysis of the four factors in Arline and whether 
the City had made an individualized inquiry.  The court concluded that a genuine issue of 
material fact did exist.  It discussed that the opinion of one doctor was not sufficient for the City 
or the district court to conclude that Holiday was not qualified for a position as a police officer.  
In the opinion the Sixth Circuit stated, “Courts need not defer to an individual’s doctor’s opinion 
that is neither based on the individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA nor supported by 
objective scientific medical evidence.”304
In addition, the court discussed the objective evidence.  First Holiday was asymptomatic and 
showed no physical signs of the infection; indeed he was in good physical condition.  The court 
examined what a typical police officer may encounter on the job.  The judges stated that the use 
of force, wrestling, and striking suspects may result in injury to both the police officer and the 
suspect.  But the court concluded that in light of the objective medical evidence the risk of 
transmitting HIV was so low that it is not significant.  Under the ADA the risk must be 
significant for an individual not to be protected.  
The Sixth Circuit in Mauro, two years prior to Holiday did not make an individualized 
analysis.  Mauro argued that the probability of transmission was so slight that it did not 
constitute a significant risk.  Mauro presented the evidence of CDC recommendations regarding 
HIV employees that states the risk from healthcare worker to patient is very small.  305  The court 
viewed the report as not complete.  The report differentiated between exposure prone and 
invasive procedures.  To perform exposure prone procedures strict guidelines should be followed 
and an expert panel should advise.  For an invasive procedure the universal precautions are 
sufficient.  Mauro usually did not even assist in surgery.  His job duties mainly included giving 
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the necessary surgical instrument(s) to the doctor during surgery.306  The court rejected Mauro’s 
argument on the ground that because some risk existed Mauro posed a direct threat to the safety 
of others.  
In both cases some risk existed.  In Holiday it was a police officer that might get injured 
during a pursuit of a suspect.  In Mauro it was a surgical technician that on rare occasion assisted 
a surgeon for a brief moment.  Arguably, Holiday on a daily basis had more direct contact with 
open wounds than Mauro because job duties of a police officer include wrestling and striking to 
subdue suspects.307  Mauro infrequently assisted with surgeries.  Therefore Holiday probably 
posed a greater risk than Mauro to the safety of others.  However, the Sixth Circuit did not rule 
or analyze the cases similarly.  This is consistent with the impression that the court’s reasoning is 
based not on logic but on fear.
2. Doe v. Chicago
The district court in Doe v. Chicago 308 reviewed a motion to dismiss a claim alleging 
violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Illinois AIDS 
Confidentiality Act.309  John and Jane applied for positions as police officers.310  Both applicants 
passed the written and psychological examinations.311  The City of Chicago Police Department 
tested Joe and Jane Doe for HIV without their consent.312  Additionally, their applications for 
jobs as police officers were rejected solely because they were HIV positive.313  John Doe 
received a conditional offer of employment, prior to the physical fitness examination conducted 
by Dr. Bransfield.314  Jane Doe did not receive an offer.315  Neither plaintiff gave consent to the 
HIV test nor were provided counseling prior to the testing.316  Afterward both plaintiffs were 
notified that they were HIV positive and they were not provided with any counseling.317  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a “custom, practice, or policy” of: “1) testing 
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candidates for HIV as a condition of employment without medical justification; 2) requiring a 
physical examination prior to proving candidates with a valid conditional offer of employment; 
3) failing to obtain consent or provide counseling with regard to HIV tests; and 4) refusing to 
hire candidates solely because of their HIV-positive status.”318  The city moved to dismiss the 
complaint arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.319
The district court analyzed the testing provision of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  
Plaintiffs alleged that the city used the result of the medical tests to discriminate against them.  
The court found that discriminatory use of medical testing is specifically prohibited under 
Section 504.320  The court held that the city was not testing in order to determine an applicant’s 
ability to perform the job.321  The court stated that the “defendants acted knowingly and 
intentionally …. and with reckless and callous indifference to plaintiffs’ rights.”322  The court 
ruled that the city’s attempt to dismiss plaintiff’s Section 504 claim of the Rehabilitation Act was 
moot.323
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States needs to gain control of the unfounded but prevalent fear of casual 
contact with HIV.  It has been twenty years since AIDS was first mentioned.  The treatment 
surrounding the disease is similar to the treatment of those that supported communism in the 
1950s.  Early in the 1950’s in the era of McCarthyism, artists were black listed and many others 
lost employment because of an incredible fear of communism.  One of the earliest cases was 
Dennis v. United States324 the defendants, were supporters and advocators of communism, 
convicted for conspiring to overthrow the government.  In Dennis those that were on trial were 
convicted on the basis of a modified version of the clear and present danger formula.325  The test 
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was if the gravity of the evil discounted by its improbability justifies an invasion of free speech 
as is necessary to avoid the danger.  In Dennis people were convicted on the premise that they 
believed in an idea.  In light of the enormity of the evil apprehended, overthrowing the U.S. 
government, the Court was focused simply upon the possibility, not the probability of its 
occurrence.  It was not until 1957, when the convictions of 14 “second string” communist leaders 
reached the Supreme Court in Yates v. U.S.,326 McCarthy had died, and so had McCarthyism. 
Strong anticommunist sentiment persisted but the analysis of the risk was construed differently.  
In Yates, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court acquitted the five defendants and remanded to the 
lower court for proceedings against the other defendants.327  The Court distinguished advocacy 
of forcible overthrow as an abstract idea from advocacy of action.  Punishment is not justified for 
simply advocating the overthrow of the government but must include specifically promoting 
obstruction of the government.  After McCarthyism ended, people were prosecuted it they had 
the intent to do harm.  The assessment of risk differs in the latter case because there is more of an 
emphasis on the likelihood of the harm occurring rather than just the idea of it happening.  The 
similarity between the strong anti-communist movement and the treatment of those HIV-positive 
is that both are supported by fear instead of rational and logic.  Akin, to this is the treatment of 
AIDS.  Millions of dollars have been dedicated for research on the disease.  There have been a 
number of studies and the leading government agency, the CDC, all have supported the 
continuation of public safety and healthcare workers to continue in their professions.  The courts 
have not adhered to the medical evidence or CDC guidelines when determining cases.  
The assessment of risk is the disparity between the cases that support HIV individuals 
keeping their job and those cases that are not.  Courts vary on how closely they examine the 
objective evidence that is presented to them.  There is also a large discrepancy as to what is 
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considered a “significant risk”.  The courts that are supportive of a healthcare or public safety 
employee continuing in their position follow the guidelines set forth by the Rehabilitation Act 
and ADA.  They carefully scrutinize the possibility of transmission.  These courts typically do 
not adhere to the misperception and fear surrounding HIV/AIDS.  Courts have difficulty in 
dealing with assessment of risk where there is an ultimate risk involved.  Now twenty years into 
the epidemic the risk is four persons assisted out of every hundred billion contacts.  As Judge 
Boggs’ dissent emphasizes that the assessment of risk is subjective.328  There are people that go 
bungee jumping and then there are others that refuse to fly.  The chance of being struck by 
lightning is much higher than the probability of contracting HIV from public safety or healthcare 
provider.  Society goes about its business during electrical storms, but despite the much lower 
risk, many courts have not permitted HIV positive health care and safety workers to continue in 
their occupations.  There is a degree of risk to every human behavior.  The issue is does an 
infinitesimal risk justify a growing population of HIV positive persons being cast out of 
occupations.  The “[f]ear of harm ought to be proportional not merely to the gravity of the harm, 
but also to the probability of the event.”329
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